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  In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007-2009, a number of “narratives” about the 
causes of the crisis have developed.  One specific narrative will be the topic of this chapter:  That 
a major (if not the major) cause of the crisis was poor corporate governance of the largest banks 
and other large financial institutions of the United States.  This poor governance encouraged the 
senior managements of these institutions to undertake excessively risky strategies that may have 
benefitted these managements but that were not in the long-run interests of the shareholder-
owners of these institutions.  The strategies caused these institutions to “blow up”, and the 
financial crisis followed. 
  An immediate implication of this narrative is that better corporate governance – a better 
alignment of the interests of senior management with the interests of their shareholders – would 
have prevented (or at least ameliorated) the crisis, and that better governance is necessary for the 
prevention of future such crises.  One manifestation of this belief is the inclusion of measures 
that are intended to improve corporate governance – especially for financial institutions – in the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-203). 
  This chapter will argue that this corporate governance narrative is largely misguided and 
reflects an inadequate understanding of modern finance and financial theory.
1  This lacuna 
applies to the understanding of the role of debt and therefore leverage in a corporation’s capital 
structure in potentially encouraging the owners of the corporation (who are protected by the 
                                                 
1 Similar critiques can be found in Carpenter et al. (2011) and Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011).   3
“limited liability” that is a part of the legal structure that pertains to corporations) to undertake 
more risky strategies than they would in the absence of the debt.  If senior managements of 
corporations are properly representing and responding to the interests of their shareholders, then 
they ought – unless restrained by the debt holders or by prudential regulators – to be undertaking 
activities that might otherwise appear to be excessively risky. 
  Accordingly, even if corporate governance is improved in the future, this improvement is 
unlikely to play a major role in restraining risk-taking and thus avoiding future financial crises.  
Instead, future avoidance must rely on a different narrative:  That excessive risk-taking (which 
ex ante may well have been in the interests of diversified shareholders) combined with excessive 
leverage (i.e., inadequate capital) by large, complex, and interconnected financial institutions that 
were inadequately restrained by prudential regulation was the cause of the crisis.  In turn, this 
calls for forestalling future financial crises the “old-fashioned” way: through heightened, 
expanded, and improved prudential regulation of these financial institutions, with a special 
emphasis on higher and better-measured capital requirements.
2 
This chapter will proceed as follows:  Because the concept of leverage is central to this 
chapter – for understanding the motives of corporate owners for excessive risk-taking and thus 
why poor corporate governance isn’t needed to explain the risky behavior and also why 
prudential regulation is appropriate for these large financial institutions – Section II will review 
the concept and its implications, as well illustrating the closely related concept of “capital” for 
financial institutions.  Section III will bring diversified owners, and then managers and corporate 
governance, into the discussion.  Section IV will provide a brief overview of prudential 
                                                 
2 This line of argument can also be found in Acharya and Richardson (2009), Acharya et al. (2010), and White 
(2009b, 2010).   4
regulation and its central role in restraining excessive risk taking by financial institutions.  And 
Section V offers a brief conclusion. 
   5
II. Understanding Leverage and Its Implications 
A. A balance sheet approach to understanding leverage. 
  Although this chapter is primarily about financial institutions and their regulation, we 
will start somewhere else:
3 a stylized balance sheet for a roughly typical manufacturing 
corporation of the middle of the decade of the 2000s,
4 as portrayed in Figure 1a.  That firm has 
assets of $100, consisting of plant, equipment, inventories, accounts receivable, cash on hand, etc.  
Its direct obligations to creditors are $60, consisting of loans owed to banks, any bonds owed to 
bond investors, accounts payable, etc.  By simple subtraction, its net worth or owners’ equity – the 
value of its assets minus the value of its direct obligations – is $40. 
  This firm has a leverage ratio – its ratio of assets to net worth – of 2½ to 1.  The sense of the 
leverage ratio can be seen in Figure 1b:  If the firm’s assets increase by $10 (to $110) – say, because 
it makes and retains operating profits of $10, or its assets simply appreciate by $10 – without an 
increase in its direct obligations, then its net worth also increases by $10 (to $50).  Thus a 10% 
increase in the value of its assets results in a 25% increase in its net worth; this is a notion of 
“leverage” that is comparable to the high school physics example of a plank and a fulcrum.
5 
  Leverage also works in reverse, as in Figure 1c:  A 10% decrease in the value of the firm's 
assets results in a 25% decrease in the value of its net worth. 
  These simple examples portray an important point:  Leverage and the (relative to assets) 
amount of net worth are inversely related to each other.  Further, the relative amount of net worth is 
important for the lenders/creditors to the corporation because of the strictures of the legal system of 
“limited liability” for the shareholder-owners:  Under limited liability, the shareholders cannot be 
                                                 
3 This section draws heavily on White (2009a). 
4 The Internal Revenue Service publishes the aggregated balance sheets of corporations, drawn from their tax filings, 
in its annual publication Statistics of Income.  For 2007 – the latest year for which IRS data are available – the net 
worth to assets ratio was about 35%.  We use the 40% in Figure 1a primarily for simplicity of the arithmetic 
calculations. 
5 In the United Kingdom and other countries that have a British orientation for their accounting and financial 
services, the term “gearing” is used to convey the same concept.  Since the physics of the transmission of force 
through a lever and through gears is similar, the use of the two terms to refer to the same balance sheet concept is 
not surprising.   6
required to support the company beyond their initial contributions.
6  Thus, in Figures 1a-1c, if the 
company’s assets were to fall below $60 (which would wipe out its net worth) and thus be 
inadequate to cover the claims of the company’s creditors, those creditors normally have no claim 
against the owners.  The creditors will simply have to divide the (inadequate) assets among 
themselves to satisfy their claims, usually in a bankruptcy proceeding. 
  There is an important corollary, from the perspective of the owners of the borrowing 
corporation:  Limited liability means that they may not bear the full losses from the “downside” of 
their corporation’s risk-taking, if the losses are so large as to more than wipe out the corporation’s 
net worth.  In turn, this limited downside alters the owners’ incentives for taking risks:  The more 
that the owners do not bear the downside losses, the greater are their incentives for taking risks, 
since they get the full gains from the upside but are limited in the losses that they bear.
7  Since net 
worth is also owners’ equity, the extent of net worth is also a measure of the disincentive for the 
owners to take large risks, since a larger net worth means that the owners have more to lose and are 
farther away from the limit on their losses that limited liability provides. 
  Accordingly, from the creditors’ perspective, the level of a company’s net worth represents 
the extent of the buffer that protects them against a decrease in the value of the company’s assets 
that would expose them to a loss, as well as an indicator of the owners’ disincentive for risk taking.  
The thicker the buffer (other things being equal), the more assured the creditors should feel. 
  Creditors to non-financial corporations long ago figured this out:  Typically, when a bank 
makes a loan to a company, there are restrictions in the lending agreement that are intended to 
prevent the company from taking excessively risky actions, the downside of which would erode the 
company’s net worth and thus place the lending bank at risk; and, as the company’s net worth buffer 
becomes thinner, the bank’s restrictions get tighter.  Similarly, when a company sells bonds into the 
                                                 
6 By contrast, for a sole proprietorship or a partnership, the owner or owners are fully liable for the obligations of 
their company, up to the limits of personal bankruptcy. 
7 Even in the absence of the limited liability protection for corporate shareholders, the limits that are created by 
personal bankruptcy generate the same kinds of incentives for risk taking.   7
securities markets, the bond buyers (who are effectively lending their funds to the company) include 
covenants in the bond indenture that place the same kinds of restrictions on a company’s actions.
8 
B. Leverage and financial institutions. 
  The same basic ideas apply to a commercial bank or thrift institution:  Figure 2a provides 
the stylized balance sheet of a well capitalized bank or thrift.  Its $100 of assets are primarily the 
loans that it makes and the bonds that it owns.  Its direct obligations of $92 are primarily its 
deposits.
9  And, again, by simple subtraction, it has $8 of net worth or owners’ equity.  For financial 
institutions, this net worth is also called “capital”.  Note that “capital” is not “money”, or “cash”, or 
“liquidity”.  It is net worth.
10  Although a bank can increase its “capital” by getting a “cash 
injection” from investors, the increase in capital occurs because the additional cash adds to the 
assets of the bank and therefore to its net worth.  If the bank lends or invests the cash (and thus 
exchanges the cash for an equivalent amount of other assets), its capital is still augmented by the 
investors’ infusion.  By contrast, a loan of an equivalent amount of cash to the bank would not 
increase its capital (and would instead increase its leverage). 
  Note that this bank has a substantially thinner net worth (capital) buffer than does the 
manufacturing firm.
11  Equivalently, it is much more leveraged: 12½ to 1.  This is illustrated in 
Figure 2b:  A 10% increase in the value of the bank's assets yields a 125% increase in the bank’s 
capital.   
  Again, leverage also works in reverse, as in Figure 2c:  A 10% decrease in the value of the 
bank’s assets more than wipes out its capital and renders it insolvent.  A yet larger decrease in the 
value of its assets yields a yet deeper insolvency, as in Figure 2d. 
                                                 
8 Although the financial markets long ago figured this out, the economics/finance literature was relatively late in 
understanding it.  See, for example, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). 
9 This stylized balance sheet is best representative of a smaller bank or thrift.  Larger banks are more likely to have 
other kinds of direct liabilities, such as bonds or repurchase agreements (“repos”), in addition to deposits. 
10 This is a rough approximation.  Especially with respect to prudential regulation, “regulatory capital” includes 
other balance sheet entries that are not normally considered to be part of net worth. 
11 It is worth noting, however, that there was a time – in the middle of the nineteenth century – when bank capital 
ratios were in the same range as the net worth ratio of the manufacturing firm of Figure 1a; see, for example, Lown 
et al. (2000).  Capital requirements declined over time to levels today that are in the range of Figure 2a.  See also 
Keeley (1990).   8
  The protections of limited liability apply to the shareholder-owners of banks and other 
depository institutions as well.
12  Accordingly, the greater leverage of financial institutions provides 
enhanced incentives for their owners to take risks at the potential expense of their depositor-
creditors.  Unlike the lender-creditors to non-financial corporations, however, the depositor-
creditors to depositories generally do not directly place restrictions on the risk-taking of the banks to 
which they have entrusted their deposits.  Instead, government regulators are the entities that impose 
these restrictions.  In an important sense, prudential regulation of depository institutions by 
government can be considered to be the public-sector counterpart to the restrictions and covenants 
that private-sector lender-creditors impose when lending to non-financial corporations.
13 
  The balance sheets – and leverage – of two other categories of financial institution (circa 
2007) are worth considering.  Figure 3 portrays the (stylized) balance sheet of the two “government-
sponsored enterprises” (GSEs): Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  As can be seen, their on-balance-
sheet ratio of capital to assets was only 4%; equivalently, their leverage was 25-to-1.  This on-
balance-sheet portrayal, however, neglects an important additional facet of the GSEs’ operations: 
their issuance of the equivalent of an additional $200 of residential mortgage-backed securities 
(RMBS).  These securities carried the GSEs’ guarantees to the RMBS investors that, in the event 
that the underlying mortgage borrowers defaulted on their obligations, the GSEs would keep the 
investors whole.  If those contingent obligations are included (as they should be, since they 
represented contingent claims against which the GSEs’ capital provided a buffer), their leverage 
was effectively 75-to-1. 
  Finally, Figure 4 portrays a (stylized) highly leveraged investment bank.  Its $100 in assets 
are its investments in bonds, loans, shares of stock, real estate, and just about any other asset -- real 
                                                 
12 Some thrifts and insurance companies are “mutuals” and are (in principle) owned by their depositors or insureds.  
Similarly, credit unions are owned by their members who are also depositors and borrowers.  The principle of 
limited liability extends to these categories of financial institutions as well, which again places the burden on 
creditors when the institution’s net worth is negative.  For these institutions, however, the categories of “creditor” 
(depositor or insured) may overlap with the category of “owner”. 
13 It’s worth noting that prudential regulation (prior to 2010) was also applied in the U.S. to bank holding 
companies, insurance companies, money market mutual funds, defined-benefit mutual funds, and broker-dealers.  
The Dodd-Frank Act extends prudential regulation to large financial institutions that pose systemic risks more 
generally.  An elaboration on the topic of prudential regulation will be provided in Section IV.   9
or financial.  Its $97 in direct obligations are in the form of loans, bonds, commercial paper, and 
other obligations.  By simple subtraction, it has only $3 in capital.  The investment bank’s leverage 
is 33⅓-to-1.  For both the GSEs and the investment bank, even modest (percentage) losses in the 
value of their assets would expose their creditors to losses. 
C. Some real-world illustrations. 
  The balance sheet examples for the categories of financial firms just discussed may seem 
fanciful.  They are not.  Table 1 presents the relevant data for the 15 largest financial firms in the 
U.S. as of year-end 2007.
14  As can be seen, their ratios of net worth (capital) to assets are roughly 
consistent with the examples. 
D. A summing up. 
  There are a number of clear lessons that emerge from this section: 
  1) Leverage magnifies the (percentage) gains and losses for the owners of a leveraged 
enterprise. 
  2) Leverage plus limited liability may distort the incentives of a corporation’s owners 
toward taking on more risk than would be the case if the owners bore the full burden of the 
downside losses. 
  3) The extent of the distortion depends on the amount of the owners’ equity (i.e., net worth – 
or, in the case of a financial institution, its capital) relative to the potential risk-taking activity.  If the 
owners’ equity is relatively large and the risks are small, limited liability will have little or no effect 
on risk taking; conversely, if the owners’ equity is small and the risks are large, limited liability may 
well encourage risk taking that would not otherwise occur if the owners bore the full downside 
consequences. 
  This last point is worth driving home with a simple numerical example:  Suppose that the 
manufacturing company of Figure 1a has an opportunity for a “bet” that may (net) yield +$5 or -$5 
                                                 
14 Year-end 2007 slightly precedes the March 2008 absorption of Bear Stearns by JPMorgan Chase, which was 
engineered and backed by the Federal Reserve and marked the first major manifestation of the shakiness of the 
largest, thinly capitalized financial institutions in the U.S.   10
with equal probability.  Since even the downside would be borne entirely by the owners (since their 
net worth of $40 would easily absorb the loss), then, if they are risk neutral, they would be 
indifferent to this opportunity (since its expected value is $0); if they are risk averse, they would 
forgo the opportunity. 
  Now suppose that the same +$5/-$5 (with equal probability) opportunity is presented to the 
bank of Figure 2a.  Again, the owners will be the full bearers of the downside, and a similar decision 
calculus should hold.
15 
  Finally, suppose that the same +$5/-$5 opportunity is presented to the investment bank of 
Figure 4.  Now the owners gain the full +$5 upside gain, while (because of limited liability) they 
bear only -$3 of the -$5 loss.  The expected value of this opportunity to the owners is now is +$1 (= 
+$5*0.5 – $3*0.5).  Risk-neutral owners should welcome this opportunity; even mildly risk-averse 
owners should be interested.  Equally important, the owners are indifferent to the size of the loss 
beyond $-3.  Whether the possible loss is -$5 or -$50 or -$500 should be of no concern to the 
owners (so long as the probability of loss stays at 50%), although it would be of great concern to the 
institution’s creditors.  In essence, uneconomic opportunities (i.e., with expected values that are 
negative) would be of interest to the owners. 
  Section III will expand on these lessons. 
 
                                                 
15 The depositors (unless they are covered by deposit insurance) and/or the deposit insurer, however, ought to be 
concerned by the substantial reduction in net worth that the downside outcome would yield, since there would then 
be only $3 of net worth, and another such opportunity could lead to the institution’s insolvency.   11
III. Leverage, Owners, Managers, and Governance 
  The discussion in Section II had no mention of corporate governance.  The examples were 
all in terms of the incentives of the owners themselves.  The important lesson is that leverage plus 
limited liability can alter the incentives of owners toward undertaking greater risk than if the owners 
bore all of the downside from risk taking. 
A. Owners, risk taking, and diversification.  
  One impediment to greater risk taking might be risk aversion on the part of the owners.  
Suppose that, in the example at the end of Section II of the +$5/-$5 (with equal probability) 
opportunity that was posed for the owners of the investment bank of Figure 4, all of the owners’ net 
worths were solely invested in the equity of that institution.  In that case, even though limited 
liability creates a positive expected value of the opportunity for the owners, they might nevertheless 
be reluctant to embrace it, since it would carry a 50% probability of wiping out their net worths. 
  Instead, however, suppose that the owners’ net worths were spread across many such 
institutions – that the owners all had diversified portfolios that encompassed dozens of such 
institutions.  Suppose further that each institution had a +$5/-$5 opportunity and that each of these 
opportunities was uncorrelated with the others – i.e., that the outcome of each opportunity depended 
solely on its 50/50 equal probability and not on the outcomes of the others.  In this case, unless the 
owners were extremely risk averse, they should want their institutions to embrace the opportunities.  
On average the owners would gain, and the possibility that they would experience an overall loss 
would be quite small.
16  In essence, they would harvest the gains and walk away from the losses 
(and re-diversify their portfolios), with the likelihood of an overall gain’s being quite high.  Finally, 
recall that the owners would be unconcerned about the size of the loss and thus would be ready to 
embrace opportunities that were uneconomic. 
                                                 
16 If an individual had a diversified portfolio of equal-size investments in 50 such institutions and all 50 undertook 
these opportunities, then the likelihood of the individual’s experiencing any overall loss at all would be only 3.2%, 
and the likelihood that the individual would experience a loss of 50% or greater to his/her net worth would be only 
0.3%.   12
  This last point is worth restating:  Diversified owners have no special reasons for preserving 
the solvency of all of the companies in which they have ownership stakes.  Instead, because of the 
downside protections of limited liability, their interests are for their companies to be operated with 
the maximum amount of leverage that those companies’ creditors and/or regulators will allow and 
for the companies to embrace risky opportunities that offer positive expected outcomes for the 
owners, even if the opportunities are uneconomic when the creditors’ losses are included and the 
downside outcomes would mean the insolvency or bankruptcy of some of the companies. 
B. Managers and governance. 
  Let us now introduce a set of senior managers that are employed by the owners.  In so doing 
we have now created the potential issue of corporate governance:  Will the senior managers 
faithfully manage the corporation in the interests of the owners?
17 
  There are at least three possible answers to this question that are relevant to our discussion 
of risk taking:
18 1) Yes they will; 2) No they won’t; they will take excessive risks; or 3) No they 
won’t, they will refrain from taking risks that would be in the interests of diversified owners.  We 
will address each possibility in turn: 
  1. Yes they will.  It is first worth considering the possibility (e.g., because of an appropriate 
incentive structure) that the managers do faithfully operate the company in the interests of its 
owners.  In this case, as the earlier part of this Section and the previous Section have argued, a 
diversified set of owners will want the managers to operate their companies at the maximum 
leverage that the companies’ creditors and/or regulators will allow and to embrace risky 
opportunities that embody positive expected values for the owners even if (because of limited 
liability) the opportunities are not economic (i.e., because the expected downside outcomes, 
including the losses to creditors, exceed the expected upside gains to the owners). 
                                                 
17 Consideration of this issue extends back at least to Berle and Means (1932).  Modern economics and finance 
consideration of it can be dated to Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983). 
18 We focus here on governance with respect to risk taking.  There are, of course, additional dimensions to the 
governance question, such as whether the senior managers may make simple choices (such as whether to merge with 
another company) that favor senior managers (who get more prestige, as well as more pay, from running a larger 
company) at the expense of owners (if the merged company is less profitable).   13
  Thus, even good governance will not rein in uneconomic risk taking. 
  2. No they won’t; they will take excessive risks.  It is surely possible that, because of poorly 
structured incentives and inadequate monitoring, that the company’s managers might embrace risky 
opportunities that rewarded the managers but that were uneconomic for the owners.  This seems to 
be the case that is envisioned by those who believe in the “poor corporate governance” narrative for 
the financial crisis and thus by the authors of the corporate governance sections of the Dodd-Frank 
Act. 
  In this case, better governance may reduce uneconomic risk taking – but the lesson of #1 is 
that better governance alone will not be sufficient to eliminate all uneconomic risk taking.  Further, 
there is evidence that the risk taking by the large U.S. financial institutions prior to the crisis of 
2007-2009 was, ex ante, in the interests of the shareholder owners of these corporations.
19 
  3. No they won’t; they will refrain from taking risks that would be in the interests of 
diversified owners.  It is worth considering the third possibility:  That managers might refrain from 
embracing risky opportunities that would otherwise be in the interests of the owners.  Consider one 
of the standard reward structures for managers:  They receive performance-based bonuses in the 
form of stock grants or stock options.  If the managers are restricted from quickly selling the stock 
or options, then their portfolios are likely to become heavily unbalanced in the direction of their 
ownership position in their company; i.e., they are unlikely (unless they are independently wealthy) 
to be well diversified.  In that case, the managers become similar to the undiversified owners that 
were described in the early part of this Section:  If the managers are risk averse, they may be 
reluctant to take the big risks that would have a positive expected value for the diversified owners, 
because the downside of those risks might greatly reduce the (undiversified) managers’ net worths. 
  In this case, ironically, poor governance serves to rein in excessive risk taking. 
C. A summing up. 
                                                 
19 Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), for example, find that the actions of the senior managers of the large U.S. financial 
institutions prior to the crisis appear to have been in the ex ante interests of their shareholder owners.   14
  It is clear that good corporate governance is far from a panacea for reining in excessive risk 
taking by financial corporations.  At best (case #2 above), it might help a little bit. 
  In short, something more than better corporate governance is needed to restrain excessive 
risk taking by financial institutions.  That something more is prudential regulation, to which we now 
turn.   15
IV. Prudential Regulation. 
  “Financial regulation” encompasses a wide range of activities and goals.
20  In this section 
we will focus on prudential regulation:
21 the regulatory effort to maintain the solvency of financial 
institutions.  As was noted earlier, prudential regulation has been applied to a number of categories 
of financial institutions; however, we will confine our attention to the prudential regulation of 
depository institutions (which, for the purposes of brevity, we will describe as “banks”).
22 
A. The arguments for prudential regulation. 
  The arguments for the prudential regulation of banks start with the leverage and limited 
liability arguments of Section II.  It’s clear that creditors to a corporation need to be protected 
against the risk-taking incentives of the corporation’s owners.  For non-financial corporations, the 
creditors are expected to protect themselves.  But for banks (and a number of other categories of 
financial institution) the creditors – for banks, they are primarily the depositors – are seen as unable 
to protect themselves adequately.  Hence, there is a longstanding tradition – in the U.S., this 
tradition extends back at least to the 1860s
23 – of having government prudential regulation as the 
substitute protector for the depositors. 
  The arguments, specifically, for government prudential regulation of banks (instead of 
relying on depositors to protect themselves through covenants or other negotiated restrictions) are: 
  1) Banks are complex and difficult to understand – except (hopefully) by experts – even 
under the best of circumstances.
24 
                                                 
20 In addition to prudential regulation, “financial regulation” can encompass efforts to protect consumers from 
“toxic” (harmful) financial products and services, protect them from fraud, require adequate information about 
financial products and services or about the finances of publicly traded companies, limit directly the prices and fees 
that can be charged by financial institutions, etc. 
21 In the U.S. the traditional phrase for this type of regulation has been “safety-and-soundness” regulation.  Outside 
of the U.S., however, “prudential” regulation has been the common term, and it is now widely used in the U.S. as 
well. 
22 Many of the arguments for and instruments of the prudential regulation of banks have their counterparts in the 
prudential regulation of other financial institutions. 
23 The National Currency Act of 1863 and the National Bank Act of 1864 created a national charter for banks and a 
national prudential regulator – the Comptroller of the Currency – to regulate them.  Even before then, the states as 
charterers of banks saw banks as special and restricted their activities.  Further, where states had created state-
backed systems of deposit insurance – New York was the first to do so in 1829 – they realized that they needed a 
system of regulation to try to contain the activities of banks that could put the deposit insurance system at risk. 
24 Morgan (2003) empirically demonstrates the validity of this argument.   16
  2) Depositors – even commercial (i.e., business) depositors – tend to be relatively 
unsophisticated with respect to understanding the activities and finances of banks. 
  3) The primary liabilities that are issued by banks tend to be short-term demandable 
deposits, which the depositors expect to be liquid and available at short notice at par (i.e., they don’t 
expect to bear losses); equivalently, there ought to be a safe place that relatively unsophisticated 
individuals (and businesses) can keep their money (and savings), as an alternative to cash that is 
stored in cookie jars or under mattresses.
25 
  4) Typically, there are large numbers of depositors in a bank, and the levels/amounts of their 
deposits vary over time.  Coordination among them, so as to agree on a set of covenants to impose 
on their bank – and to agree on who should do the necessary monitoring -- would be far more 
difficult than is the case for bond covenants (where there is typically a trustee, as well as a few 
dominant block holders of the bonds that have been issued by any company) or bank loans to non-
financial corporations (where there is typically a single bank or a consortium of a few banks). 
  5) Because of #1-4, banks are susceptible to runs:
26  If some depositors are unsure about the 
value of the bank’s assets but are worried that the assets may be inadequate to satisfy all depositors’ 
claims, those depositors may want to “run” to the bank to withdraw their funds before other 
depositors get the same idea.  Other depositors, seeing or hearing about the first group's actions, 
may similarly rush to withdraw their funds. 
  This general depositor “run” on the bank can be exacerbated by the realization that even a 
solvent bank is relatively illiquid, in the sense that it has loaned out almost all of the depositors’ 
funds and keeps only a small amount of cash on hand to deal with “normal” withdrawals. (Think of 
Jimmy Stewart's efforts, in the movie “It's a Wonderful Life,” to stop his depositors’ run by 
explaining to them that their money is not in the till but has been loaned to their neighbors.) 
                                                 
25 This last version is really an argument for deposit insurance; but then the deposit insurer would want a system of 
prudential regulation to protect itself. 
26 More formal discussions can be found in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Postlewaite and Vives (1987), and Chen 
(1999).   17
  And, if depositors in the bank across the street see the run on the first bank and they fear that 
the same problems may apply to their bank as well, the depositors in this second bank may start a 
run on their bank.  Thus can a “contagion” or “cascade” of bank runs can develop.
27 
  6) Since a bank that is subject to a run by its depositors cannot satisfy all of their demands 
for cash withdrawals, the bank must either close (declare bankruptcy or its equivalent) or suspend 
payment until it can liquidate its assets.
28  Either of these outcomes would be unsatisfactory to 
depositors, which can serve to heighten fears and exacerbate runs. 
  7) The closure of a bank because of insolvency will impose losses on relatively 
unsophisticated depositors.  These losses may be considered to be unacceptable politically (as well 
as exacerbating the depositor nervousness that leads to runs). 
  8) The closure of a bank and the liquidation of its assets – which will mean the calling in 
(i.e., requiring repayment) of its loans – may deprive local households and businesses of a 
significant source of credit.  Even if there are alternative lending sources, the specialized knowledge 
that the bank has developed as to who is a creditworthy borrower (and who is not) may be lost, to 
the detriment of those creditworthy borrowers (who, at a minimum, will have to demonstrate their 
creditworthiness to another potential lender).
29 
  The roles of a prudential regulator, a central bank, and deposit insurance in maintaining a 
stable banking system can now be seen.  Prudential regulation is intended to prevent the bank from 
becoming insolvent and thereby prevent depositors from being exposed to losses.
30  The central 
bank can lend (provide liquidity) to an otherwise illiquid but solvent bank, to help the bank deal 
with any temporary nervousness that might develop among its depositors.
31  And deposit insurance 
                                                 
27 As became clear in September 2008, similar “runs” were possible by the short-term creditors to the thinly 
capitalized large investment banks in the U.S. 
28 And even for a solvent bank, the forced liquidation of its assets would likely yield losses and thus render it 
insolvent, generating losses for even the patient depositors. 
29 For example, Bernanke (1983) demonstrated that this was one of the major costs of the thousands of bank closures 
that accompanied the U.S. economy’s descent into the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
30 For a skeptical view as to the efficacy of prudential regulation, especially outside of the U.S. context, see Barth et 
al. (2006). 
31 Of course, in lending to the bank, the central bank becomes a creditor to the bank; at a minimum the central bank 
will want adequate collateral for its loan, and, more generally, it will want to assure itself of the solvency of the bank 
to which it is lending.   18
provides a back-up reassurance to depositors and thus serves as an additional; backstop against bank 
runs, in the event that prudential regulation has failed to prevent the bank’s insolvency.
 32 
B. The primary tools of prudential regulation. 
 1.  Capital  adequacy.  Since the goal of prudential regulation is to maintain the solvency of 
banks – i.e.,  to ensure that they have positive levels of capital – minimum capital levels (relative to 
the risks that are undertaken by the bank) are at the heart of any system of prudential regulation. 
33 
Equivalently (as is clear from Section II), this means limits on leverage. 
  For all financial institutions, capital levels are so thin that accurate measurements of the 
value of the institution’s assets -- and thus of its capital (because capital is determined by simple 
subtraction) -- are crucial.  An accounting system that relies primarily on market values for the 
determination of asset values (with some allowance for the vagaries of thin markets), rather than 
on historical costs or on projected cash flows, is essential. 
  As a bank’s capital buffer gets thinner, prudential regulators should progressively restrict 
its activities.  At the limit of insolvency, the regulator must declare a receivership and take full 
control of the bank (see #6 below).  This system of progressive restrictions has come to be called 
“prompt corrective action.” 
  2. Activities limitations.  In principle, if prudential regulators could accurately ascertain the 
risks of all potential activities by a bank – including non-financial activities, such as owning and 
operating an automobile manufacturing facility, or a large department store – and could thereby 
assign the appropriate capital levels, then there would be no need for any restrictions on the 
activities of banks.  More realistically, prudential regulators will be limited in their ability to 
ascertain the riskiness of most non-financial activities – and perhaps even of some financial 
activities.  If prudential regulators cannot ascertain the riskiness of an activity, that activity ought not 
to be permitted for a bank.
34 
                                                 
32 For general arguments along these lines, see White (1991). 
33 Included in capital should be a “slice” of subordinated debt and/or debt that converts to equity (“contingent 
capital”) when capital levels decline. 
34 However, that activity may well be appropriate for a non-financial holding company of a bank.  See White 
(2009c) for a general argument along these lines.   19
  3. Managerial competency requirements.  The failure of a bank – even a small, local bank – 
is clearly a more serious event than the failure of a corner delicatessen.  Requiring that the senior 
managers of a bank demonstrate their competency at running a bank naturally follows.
35 
  4. Close monitoring of the financial flows between a bank and its owners.  Because it is too 
easy to loot a bank – to extract assets from the bank in a way that benefits its owners but that leaves 
the liability holders at risk (such as excessive dividends to the owners, or favorable loans to the 
owners or to their family or their friends) – prudential regulators must closely monitor the financial 
flows between a bank and its owners (or their family, or their friends). 
 5.  Adequate  numbers  of well-trained and well-paid regulators.  Because prudential 
regulation involves sophisticated monitoring of sophisticated financial institutions, adequate 
numbers of well-trained and well-paid personnel to conduct this monitoring are essential. 
  6. A receivership regime for insolvent banks.  Once a bank reaches insolvency, it must be 
placed in a receivership (usually operated by the regulator or the deposit insurer).  The receivership 
extinguishes the rights of the owners and usually dismisses the senior management who “drove the 
bank into the ditch.”  The regulator can then decide whether the best course of action is to liquidate 
the bank or to find an acquirer.
36 
C. What role for improved governance? 
  Is there room for improved governance as part of the prudential regulation of banks?  The 
answer is “yes”; but the full nuances of this “yes” should be understood: 
  First, improvements in governance can, at most, be just a modest part of prudential 
regulation. 
                                                 
35 U.S. bank regulators require such competency on the part of the senior management for start-up (denovo) banks.  
And it remains an occasionally used tool for personnel removal at more seasoned banks. 
36 The operation of a receivership is best envisioned as operating in conjunction with the deposit insurer:  The 
deposit insurer pays off the insured depositors and then must deal with its consequent loss: the negative net worth 
“hole” of the insolvent bank.  The receiver tries to find the best route to maximizing the value of the remaining 
assets and thus minimizing the size of the deposit insurer’s loss.   20
  Second, restraints in managerial risk taking that would otherwise exceed the levels that are 
in the shareholders’ interests are in the interests of the depositors (or the deposit insurer) as well as 
in the interests of shareholders. 
  But, third, the necessary restrictions on managerial risk taking so as to enhance the prospects 
for solvency of the bank require much more extensive restrictions than those that would be in the 
interests of diversified shareholder owners and thus ought not to be considered to be part of a 
program of “improved governance”.   21
V. Conclusion 
  Is there a relationship between corporate governance and the prudential regulation of banks?  
The answer must be, “Yes; but just barely.”  If the managers of banks are undertaking risky 
strategies that are beyond those that are in the interests of the banks’ shareholder owners, then 
improved corporate governance also serves the larger interests of society in preserving the solvency 
of banks. 
  But, as this chapter has argued, the diversified shareholder owners will want their managers 
to undertake considerably more risk than is in society’s interests.  In that important sense, then, 
prudential regulation of banks must require bank managers to undertake less risk (and maintain 
higher levels of capital, etc.) than would otherwise be in their owners’ interests.  In that sense, good 
prudential regulation must (ironically) worsen the corporate governance of banks. 
  
   22
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Figure 1a: The Balance Sheet of a Typical Manufacturing Corporation 
 
Assets                           Liabilities 
 
      $100 (plant, equip.,         $60 (bank loans, bonds 
               inv., cash, etc.)    issued, accts. payable, etc.) 
      ------------------------------------------- 
                   $40 (net worth, owners’ 
        e q u i t y )  
  Net worth/assets: 40% 




Figure 1b: A Modified Balance Sheet of a Typical Manufacturing Corporation 
 
Assets                           Liabilities 
 
      $110  $100 (plant, equip.,         $60 (bank loans, bonds 
      +10%         inv., cash, etc.)    issued, accts. payable, etc.) 
      ------------------------------------------- 
      $50  $40 (net worth, owners’ 
      +25%   equity) 
  Net worth/assets: 45% 




Figure 1c: Another Modified Balance Sheet of a Typical Manufacturing Corporation 
 
Assets                           Liabilities 
 
        $90  $100 (plant, equip.,         $60 (bank loans, bonds 
      -10%          inv., cash, etc.)    issued, accts. payable, etc.) 
      ------------------------------------------- 
      $30  $40 (net worth, owners’ 
      -25%   equity) 
  Net worth/assets: 33% 
  Leverage: 3 / 1   25
Figure 2a: The Balance Sheet of a Well Capitalized Bank or Thrift 
 
Assets                           Liabilities 
 
      $100 (loans, bonds,         $92 (deposits) 
                  investments) ---------------------------------------- 
                     $8 (net worth, owners’ 
        e q u i t y ,   c a p i t a l )  
 Capital/assets:  8% 
  Leverage: 12½ / 1 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 2b: A Modified Balance Sheet of a Well Capitalized Bank or Thrift 
 
Assets                           Liabilities 
 
      $110  $100 (loans, bonds,         $92 (deposits) 
      +10%            investments) ---------------------------------------- 
        $18  $8 (net worth, owners’ 
      +125%    equity, capital) 
 Capital/assets:  16% 
  Leverage: 6.1 / 1 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 2c: A Balance Sheet of an Insolvent Bank or Thrift 
 
Assets                           Liabilities 
 
        $90  $100 (loans, bonds,         $92 (deposits) 
      -10%             investments) ---------------------------------------- 
          $-2  $8 (net worth, owners’ 
      -125%    equity, capital) 
 Capital/assets:  ? 
 Leverage:  ? 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 2d: The Balance Sheet of a Deeply Insolvent Bank or Thrift 
 
Assets                           Liabilities 
 
       $70 (loans, bonds,         $92 (deposits) 
                  investments) ---------------------------------------- 
                  $-22 (net worth, owners’ 
        e q u i t y ,   c a p i t a l )  
  
Capital/assets: ? 
 Leverage:  ?   26
Figure 3: The Balance Sheet of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac 
 
Assets                           Liabilities 
 
      $100 (residential         $96 (bonds, loans, c.p.) 
                   mortgages) ---------------------------------------- 
                              $4 (net worth, owners’ 
        e q u i t y ,   c a p i t a l )  
 
  plus $200 of issued RMBS carrying the GSEs’ guarantees 
 
  Capital/assets: 4% (1⅓% if RMBS guarantees are included) 
  Leverage: 25 / 1 (75 / 1 if RMBS guarantees are included)   27
Figure 4: The Balance Sheet of a Highly Leveraged Investment Bank 
 
Assets                           Liabilities 
 
      $100 (loans, bonds,         $97 (bonds, loans, com. paper) 
            stocks, real estate, ---------------------------------------- 
              investments)            $3 (net worth, owners’ 
        e q u i t y ,   c a p i t a l )  
 
Capital/assets: 3% 
Leverage: 33⅓ / 1 
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Table 1: The Fifteen Largest Financial Institutions in the U.S., 2007 
(by asset size, December 31, 2007) 
 
 
Rank  Financial institution  Category 
Assets 
($ billion) 
Equity as a 
% of assets 
      
1 Citigroup  Commercial  bank  $2,182  5.2%
2  Bank of America  Commercial bank  1,716  8.6
3  JPMorgan Chase  Commercial bank  1,562  7.9
4  Goldman Sachs  Investment bank  1,120  3.8
5 American  International  Group Insurance  conglomerate  1,061  9.0
6  Morgan Stanley  Investment bank  1,045  3.0
7  Merrill Lynch  Investment bank  1,020  3.1
8 Fannie  Mae  GSE  883  5.0
9 Freddie  Mac  GSE  794  3.4
10 Wachovia  Commercial  bank  783  9.8
11 Lehman  Brothers  Investment  bank  691  3.3
12  Wells Fargo  Commercial bank  575  8.3
13 MetLife  Insurance  559  6.3
14 Prudential  Insurance  486  4.8
15  Bear Stearns  Investment bank  395  3.0
 
  Note: The Federal Home Loan Bank System ($1,272B in 2007) and TIAA-CREF ($420B 
in 2007) have been excluded from this list; if GE Capital were a standalone finance company, its 
asset size ($650B in 2007) would place it at #12. 
Source: Fortune 500, May 5, 2008, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (for Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac). 
 